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Funding of Medically-Necessary Abortions:
A Reexamination of U.S. Law and a Call for
EC Federalism
John Nishit
The European Court of Justice ("ECJ") has failed to resolve
the question of whether the EEC Treaty requires Member States
to fund medically-necessary abortions,1 or whether that decision
must be left to the discretion of the individual Member States. Al-
though parties have raised the issue before the Court, the ECJ has
not yet addressed this matter directly.2 Since the European Com-
munity ("EC" or "Community") Member States disagree whether
abortion should be freely available or tightly restricted, this issue
remains highly controversial.
The individual Member States have a strong interest in con-
trolling matters of internal public policy.3 However, the Member
States' interest in retaining autonomy over their national abortion
policies directly conflicts not only with the EC's commitment in
the Single European Act ("SEA") to create a unified Europe with-
out internal frontiers," but also with EC efforts to guarantee cer-
t B.A. 1977, Yale University; M.M. 1980, University of Southern California; J.D. Can-
didate 1993, University of Chicago.
An abortion is medically-necessary if needed to avoid permanent or serious injury to
the pregnant woman.
" See Case 182/78, Bestuur van het Algemeen Ziekenfonds Drenthe-Platteland v G.
Pierik ("Pierik 11"), 1979 ECR 1977, 1980:2 CMLR 88. Although Pierik II involved medical
funding in general, both the Advocate General, see 1979 ECR at 1999-2000, and one of the
interested parties, see text at note 32, alluded to the issue of abortion funding.
' As Judge Walsh of the Irish Supreme Court reasoned:
The fact that particular activities, even grossly immoral ones, may be permitted to
a greater or lesser extent in some Member States does not mean that they are
considered to be within the objectives of the . . . [EEC Treaty]. A fortiori it can-
not be one of the objectives of the European Communities that a Member State
should be obliged to permit activities which are clearly designed to set at naught
the constitutional guarantees for the protection within the State of a fundamental
human right.
Society for the Protection of Unborn Children (Ireland) v Stephen Grogan and Others
("Grogan 11"), 1990:1 CMLR 689, 704 (Irish Supreme Court, Dec 19, 1989).
Treaty Est the Eur Eco Comm, Art 8(a).
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tain fundamental rights.5 Consequently, resolution of the abortion-
funding question will inevitably require either that Member States
relinquish sovereignty over vital policy areas or that the EC com-
promise in its efforts toward a truly unified Europe.
In Harris v McRae,' the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the Hyde
Amendment, 7 which denied indigent women Medicaid funding for
medically-necessary abortions. Though the Court acknowledged
that "financial constraints . . restrict an indigent woman's ability
to enjoy the full range of [her] constitutionally protected freedom
of choice ... ." it concluded that the federal government is not
constitutionally obligated to provide funding for medically-neces-
sary abortions." The Court reasoned that, because the State did
not cause an indigent woman's poverty, the State had no obligation
to supply the funding that would give an indigent woman full free-
dom of choice.'
Part I of this Comment explores ECJ discussion of EEC
Treaty provisions relevant to the abortion-funding issue and dis-
cusses internal inconsistencies of the EEC Treaty that the abortion
funding issue brings into sharp relief. Part II analyzes and criti-
cizes Harris v McRae in light of the right to privacy, arguing that
the Harris majority erred in holding the Hyde Amendment consti-
tutional. Part III examines abortion funding as a sex equality issue
under both the U.S. Constitution and the EEC Treaty, concluding
that principles of equality central to each document should be in-
terpreted to require the State to fund medically-necessary
abortions.
This Comment discusses how ECJ approaches to funding are
germane to the constitutional arguments made in Harris, conclud-
ing that the Supreme Court would profit by adopting ECJ ap-
proaches to funding questions. Conversely, this Comment proposes
methods by which the ECJ might profit by examining abortion
funding in light of American perspectives. Finally, this Comment
suggests that the inconsistencies in the EEC Treaty exposed by the
abortion funding controversy raise the same federalism issues tack-
led prior to ratification of the U.S. Constitution: the individual
See, for example, EEC, Art 119 (guaranteeing equal pay for men and women), and
Council Dir 79/7, 1979 OJ L6:24 (prohibiting sex discrimination in matters of social secur-
ity). See also, Mary Frances Dominick, Toward a Community Bill of Rights: The European
Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights, 14 Fordham Intl L J 639 (1990/91).
o 448 US 297 (1980).
Pub L No 96-123, § 109, 93 Stat 926 (1979).
o Harris, 448 US at 316.
9 Id.
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Member States will be forced to decide whether or not to trade
autonomy over certain areas of national public policy for the bene-
fits of participation in the sort of fully unified community envi-
sioned by the SEA and a Community Bill of Rights.
I. FUNDING FOR MEDICALLY-NECESSARY ABORTIONS IN THE EC
The abortion policies of the twelve EC Member States differ
dramatically, ranging from allowing elective abortions early in
pregnancy (Denmark and Greece),' 0 to permitting abortions when
circumstances pose exceptional hardship for the pregnant woman
(the UK and the Netherlands)," to prohibiting all abortions, ex-
cept those necessary to save the life of the mother (Ireland). 2
These policy differences raise questions about the extent to which
the EEC Treaty preserves, for women residing in Member States
with restrictive abortion laws, the right to seek out procedures
available in neighboring Member States with more liberal abortion
provisions.
Three EEC Treaty Articles aimed at eradicating discrimina-
tion on the basis of nationality and sex provide potential answers
to the abortion funding issue. Article 48 guarantees workers the
right to move freely within the EC; Article 59 assures the freedom
to provide services; and Council Directive 79/7,13 a corollary to Ar-
ticle 119, guarantees equal treatment for men and women in mat-
ters of social security health insurance. ECJ interpretations of both
the free movement of workers and the freedom to provide services
implicitly mandate Member State funding for medically-necessary
abortions. However, public policy exceptions to those Articles may
preclude the EC from requiring Member States that have criminal-
ized abortion to fund abortions legally received in other Member
,o In Denmark and Greece, "[a]bortion in the early stages of pregnancy does not re-
quire any reason and is treated as the decision of the woman, or of the woman and her
physician .... " Mary Ann Glendon, Abortion and Divorce in Western Law 22 (Harvard U
Press, 1987).
,1 Id at 13-14. "Exceptional hardship," depending on the particular Member State,
might include the health of the woman or fetus, the woman's mental health, the circum-
stances under which the pregnancy occurred, and economic or other circumstances that
make continuing the pregnancy a hardship for either the woman involved or her family. See
id at 21.
12 Id at 161 n 12. See also, Irish Const, Art 40, § 3(3) ("The State acknowledges the
right to life of the unborn and, with due regard to the equal right to life of the mother,
guarantees in its laws to respect, and, so far as practicable, by its laws to defend and vindi-
cate that right.").
11 1979 OJ L6:24 (cited in note 5) (on the progressive implementation of the principle
of equal treatment for men and women in matters of social security).
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States. For that reason, Council Directive 79/7," which contains no
policy exception, provides the strongest argument that the EC
must require all Member States to fund legally obtained abortions.
A. Article 48: Free Movement of Workers
In Bestuur van het Algemeen Ziekenfonds Drenthe-Platte-
land v G. Pierik ("Pierik II"), 5 the ECJ interpreted Article 48 of
the EEC Treaty 6 to require a worker's17 Member State to pay for
indispensable medical procedures necessarily performed in another
Member State.'" Since medically-necessary abortions are, by defi-
nition, indispensable medical procedures, Pierik II implies that
Member States must fund those abortions. However, since the
public policies of individual Member States can override Article
48,19 the ECJ would most likely conclude that the EC must allow
Member States which have criminalized abortion to refuse
funding.
In Pierik II, the plaintiff, a resident of the Netherlands, had
claimed repayment for costs incurred when she received medical
treatment in Germany for a rheumatic ailment.2 0 The ECJ held
that, even though the Netherlands had deliberately excluded that
treatment from its health benefit plan, the Netherlands must reim-
" See discussion in Part III B of this Comment.
" Case 182/78, 1979 ECR 1977, 1980:2 CMLR 88.
" The text of Article 48 states, in pertinent part:
1. Freedom of movement for workers shall be secured within the Community by
the end of the transitional period at the latest.
2. Such freedom of movement shall entail the abolition of any discrimination
based on nationality between workers of the Member States as regards employ-
ment, remuneration and other conditions of work and employment.
3. It shall entail the right, subject to limitations justified on grounds of public
policy, public security or public health:
(a) to accept offers of employment actually made;
(b) to move freely within the territory of the Member States for this purpose
1 In Pierik II, the ECJ construed "worker" extremely broadly to include "any person
who has the capacity of a person insured under the social security legislation of one or more
Member State, whether or not he pursues a professional or trade activity." Case 182/78,
Pierik II, 1979 ECR at 1992. Thus, "worker" includes not only employees, but their families,
those on disability pensions, the retired, and the formerly employed.
18 Id at 1992 and 1997. The ECJ relied on Council Reg 1408/71, 1971 OJ Eng Spec Ed
416, which was "promulgated in pursuance of Article 48, EEC .... " B2 Encyclopedia of
European Community Law B10047 (Sweet & Maxwell, 1988) (General Note to EEC, Art
48). See also, Case 182/78, Pierik II, 1979 ECR at 1999 (Advocate General's opinion).
' See note 16.
20 Case 182/78, Pierik H, 1979 ECR at 1999.
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burse the plaintiff.21 The ECJ explained that the social security
health plan of the plaintiff's home state must pay for medically-
necessary treatments
where the treatment provided in another Member State
is more effective than that which the person concerned
can receive in the Member State where he resides and
[where] the treatment in question cannot be provided on
the territory of the latter State.22
As long as the worker's country of residence "acknowledges
that the treatment in question constitutes a necessary and effective
[medical treatment], 23 that country has an obligation to pay. This
is true even if "the treatment in question is deliberately not in-
cluded in the scheme of benefits . . . administered by [the
worker's country of residence], for example on medical, medical-
ethical or financial grounds . ".. 24 The Pierik II holding flows
naturally from the ECJ's argument in an earlier treatment of the
same case that the free movement of workers would be compro-
mised unless workers, regardless of nationality, were entitled to re-
ceive health benefits available in any of the Member States.25
The ECJ's guarantee of medical funding, however, does not
clearly extend to payment for medically-necessary abortions.
Pierik II implies that the costs of medically-necessary abortions
should be reimbursed by the worker's country of residence, even if
that country had deliberately excluded abortion payments from its
social security health plan.26 However, Article 48 of the EEC
Treaty states that a worker's right to freedom of movement shall
be "subject to limitations justified on grounds of public policy
2 Id at 1992 and 1997.
21 Id at 1994 (quoting Case 177/77, Bestuur van het Algemeen Ziekenfonds Drenthe-
Platteland v G. Pierik ("Pierik I"), 1978 ECR 825, 836, 1978 CMLR 343).
23 Case 182/78, Pierik 11, 1979 ECR at 1995.
24 Id at 1992 (emphasis added). The ECJ did not expressly decide whether a Member
State would be required to fund abortion if abortion were "deliberately not included [on]
medical-ethical . . . grounds." The Court apparently heeded the Advocate General's cau-
tionary statement:
I . . . reserve the case of treatment which would be patently contrary to the pub-
lic morality of the State of habitual residence. However, I would consider it un-
profitable, if not dangerous, in the context of this case to deal in a general and
abstract way with various medical-ethical grounds upon which a certain kind of
treatment might be deliberately excluded from the scheme of benefits paid for by
sickness funds.
Id at 1999-2000.
22 Case 177/77, Pierik I, 1978 ECR at 836.
26 See Case 182/78, Pierik 11, 1979 ECR at 1992.
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.... ,,27 Thus, the argument that Pierik II should apply to the
funding of medically-necessary abortions fails if the worker's coun-
try of residence defends its refusal to provide funding with a suffi-
ciently powerful public policy justification.
The courts must establish whether a given public policy justi-
fies infringing a worker's freedom of movement as guaranteed by
Article 48.28 The ECJ has narrowly defined "[p]ublic policy [to]
relate principally to the prevention of crime and of political sub-
version, [and] ...has further limited the use of [public policy]
exceptions, mainly by applying the principle of proportionality. ' 29
In Adoui and Cornuaille,30 the ECJ provided a clear state-
ment of the principle of proportionality. Adoui and Cornuaille
held that two French prostitutes could not be expelled from
Belgium on the basis of their vocation, as the penalty of expulsion
applied to foreign nationals was not "proportional" to the rela-
tively lenient penalties imposed on Belgian nationals.3 1 As inter-
preted by the ECJ, the public policy exception to Article 48 re-
quires that Member States impose legal sanctions on domestic
violators which are of proportional severity to the restriction of
freedom of movement imposed on the non-resident worker. 32
Pierik II and Adoui and Cornuaille indicate that the determina-
tion of whether a Member State's anti-abortion laws represent a
sufficiently strong public policy to defeat a worker's right to medi-
cal payment would depend on the severity of the sanction imposed
on a domestic violator.
Although the ECJ in Pierik II did not address abortion fund-
ing,33 the U.K. argued in a brief submitted to the ECJ that the
27 EEC, Art 48(3).
28 Julian Curral, Unlawful Discrimination in Employment-An Outline of the Euro-
pean Community Rules and CaseLaw, 20 Ga J Intl & Comp L 13, 16-17 (1990).
29 Curral, 20 Ga J Intl & Comp L at 17 (cited in note 28). See, for example, Joined
Cases 115 and 116/81, Rezguia Adoui v Belgian State and City of Liege; Dominique
Cornuaille v Belgian State ("Adoui and Cornuaille") 1982 ECR 1665, 1982:3 CMLR 631;
Case 30/77, Regina v Pierre Bouchereau, 1977 ECR 1999, 1977:2 CMLR 800; Case 41/74,
Van Duyn v Home Office, 1974:2 ECR 1337, 1975:1 CMLR 1; Case 67/74, Bonsignore v
Stadt Koln, 1975 ECR 297; Case 36/75, Roland Rutili v Minister for the Interior, 1975 ECR
1219, 1976:1 CMLR 140.
10 Joined Cases 115 and 116/81, 1982 ECR 1665.
1' Id at 1707-08. Notice that the ECJ weighed the Belgian prostitution policy and the
EC mandated right equally. Ronald Dworkin would maintain that by putting a "right" and
a policy on equal footing, the ECJ does violence to the concept of "right" which, properly
understood, can be outweighed only by another right, and never by a policy. See Ronald
Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 90-94 (Harvard U Press, 1977).
32 Joined Cases 115 and 116/81, Adoui and Cornuaille, 1982 ECR at 1708.
3' See note 22.
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public policy exception contained in Article 48(3) provides that the
worker's country of residence
can refuse the authorization [of payment] where it con-
cerns a treatment which is seriously contrary to the ethi-
cal rules prevailing in the Member State in question ...
Thus a competent [health] institution can refuse the au-
thorization to undergo an abortion in another Member
State only if abortion is prohibited in the competent in-
stitution's own country.3"
According to this argument, a Member State's public policy of
criminalized abortion outweighs the restrictions on workers' free-
dom of movement created by the denial of funding.
In summary, the ECJ would probably conclude that if medi-
cally-necessary abortions are legal within a worker's nation of resi-
dence, but that nation does not provide funding, Article 48 would
require the health institution of that nation to pay for the proce-
dure if performed legally in another Member State. If, however,
the worker resides in a Member State, such as Ireland, which im-
poses substantial criminal sanctions against medically-necessary
abortions, the health institution of that State need not fund an
abortion legally obtained in another Member State. Thus, the pub-
lic policy exceptions incorporated into Article 48 of the EEC
Treaty allow, at the very most, only partial Community regulation
of abortion funding.
B. Article 59: Freedom to Provide Services
In the absence of a public policy exception, the ECJ probably
would conclude that the Article 59 provisions concerning the free-
dom to provide services require all Member States to reimburse
the costs of legally performed abortions. Like Article 48, however,
Article 59 is conditioned by a public policy exception.35 Therefore,
Article 59 does not necessarily require a Member State that has
criminalized abortion to fund abortions legally provided to its citi-
zens in another Member State.
34 Case 182/78, Pierik H, written proc at E (LEXIS, Europe Library, Alleur File). See
also, Case 182/78, Pierik H, 1979 ECR at 1991.
"1 See EEC, Art 56.
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The ECJ held in 1984 in Luisi and Carbone3 6 that the free-
dom to provide services guaranteed by Article 59 of the EEC
Treaty37
includes the freedom, for the recipients of the services, to
go to another Member State in order to receive a service
there, without being obstructed by restrictions, even in
relation to payments . . . . [P]ersons receiving medical
treatment . . . are to be regarded as recipients of
381services.
The ECJ reasoned that restricting a recipient's freedom to travel
would, as a result, restrict the freedom to provide the service, thus
violating the spirit of Article 59.39
In Society for the Protection of Unborn Children (Ireland)
Ltd. v Grogan and Others ("Grogan III"),4° the ECJ recently held
that "medical termination of pregnancy, performed in accordance
with the law of the State in which it is carried out, constitutes a
service within the meaning of Article 60 EEC.""' Therefore, since
some Member States pay the cost of the service of abortion,42 the
ECJ could construe the freedom to receive services guaranteed by
Luisi and Carbone to require that all Member States pay for that
service.43
The Article 59 argument, however, suffers from the same pub-
lic policy infirmity as does the Article 48 argument. Although Arti-
cle 59 assures that "restrictions on freedom to provide services
within the Community shall be progressively abolished . . .,- Ar-
11 Joined Cases 286/82 and 26/83, Graziana Luisi and Giuseppe Carbone v Ministero
del Tesoro ("Luisi and Carbone"), 1984 ECR 377, 1985:3 CMLR 57.
17 Article 59 provides that ". . . restrictions on freedom to provide services within the
Community shall be progressively abolished . . . in respect of nationals of Member States
who are established in a State of the Community other than of the person for whom the
services are intended." EEC, Art 59.
, Luisi and Carbone, 1984 ECR at 403.
" Id at 401.
40 Case C-159/90, Society for the Protection of Unborn Children (Ireland) Limited v
Grogan and Others ("Grogan III"), 1991:3 CMLR 849.
" 1991:3 CMLR at 890-91. Article 59 uses the term "service" as it is defined in Article
60.
,' See Jodi L. Jacobson, The Global Politics of Abortion 17-18 (Worldwatch Paper 97,
1990).
11 In reaching this conclusion, the ECJ might interpret Article 59 as it did Article 48 in
Pierik II. The freedom to provide services, like workers' free movement, would be compro-
mised unless a service which is funded in one Member State is funded in all.
,4 EEC, Art 59.
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ticle 56 establishes an exception to Article 59,45 allowing Member
States to provide "by law, regulation or administrative action...
for special treatment of foreign nationals on grounds of public pol-
icy, public security or public health. ' 40 Thus, the ECJ might well
conclude that Article 59, for the same reasons as Article 48, allows
the EC to regulate only those abortion funding decisions involving
Member States that have not criminalized abortion.
C. Funding for Medically-Necessary Abortion: The Challenge to
Member States' Autonomy
The public policy exceptions limiting the freedoms guaranteed
by Articles 48 and 59 of the EEC Treaty clash with the provisions
of both the SEA and a Community Bill of Rights.47 The EC na-
tions, in attempting to take advantage of the benefits inherent in
an economic community while retaining sovereignty over political
and social matters, pursue fundamentally conflicting goals. The
SEA and the goals central to a Community Bill of Rights can be
realized fully only if Member States are willing to subordinate
their social policies to Community goals. Thus, controversial issues,
such as abortion funding, must be regulated by the EC, not by the
individual Member States.
The EEC Treaty initially incorporated antidiscrimination
measures for economic, not ideological reasons. For instance, the
EC adopted Article 119 (the equal pay for equal work provision)
because France had implemented equal pay for men and women
and wanted to eliminate competition from other Member States
that used cheaper female labor.'8 Over time, the jurisprudence of
the ECJ has transformed antidiscrimination provisions-initially
included in the EEC Treaty as means to economic ends-into judi-
cial mandates resembling fundamental rights. 9 In addition to this
trend in ECJ decisions, parties both internal and external to the
See EEC, Art 66 ("The provisions of Articles 55 to 58 shall apply to the matters
covered by this Chapter [which includes Article 59].").
EEC, Art 56 (emphasis added).
See Dominick, 14 Fordham Intl L J at 639 (cited in note 5).
Curral, 20 Ga J Intl & Comp L at 20-21 (cited in note 28). See also, Odile Quintin,
The Policies of the European Communities with Special Reference to the Labour Market,
in Mary Buckley and Malcolm Anderson, eds, Women, Equality and Europe 71 (MacMillan
Press, 1988).
. 9 Comment, Fundamental Misconceptions about Fundamental Rights: The Changing
Nature of Women's Rights in the EC and Their Application in the United Kingdom, 31
Harv Intl L J 565, 570 (1990), citing case 149/77, Defrenne v Sabena Airlines III, 1978 ECR
1365, 1378, 1978:3 CMLR 312.
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EC advocate the adoption of a Community Bill of Rights as a
means of solidifying Community-wide, judicially-articulated, fun-
damental rights.50
Rights, however, whether derived by the ECJ from the EEC
Treaty or contained in a Community Bill of Rights, must super-
sede policies in order to maintain their character as rights.51 As the
abortion-funding example illustrates, the public policy exceptions
to Articles 48 and 59 preclude the EC from absolutely guarantee-
ing the "rights" of free movement and of the freedom to provide
services. Attempts to make the EC the guarantor of Community-
wide rights will continue to be frustrated as long as the Treaty al-
lows individual Member States' public policies to defeat these
"rights."
The EEC Treaty, initially intended only as an economic agree-
ment, allows Member States to retain sovereignty over national
public policy. However, EEC Treaty provisions enabling national
public policy to trump Community goals render the Treaty inade-
quate not only as a guarantor of rights, but as an economic agree-
ment as well.
Just as the availability of funding for medical treatment af-
fected the labor force in Pierik II and Luisi, the availability of
abortion funding similarly affects the composition of workers
within a given Member State.52 This reasoning underlies the justi-
fication for all of the antidiscrimination and free movement Arti-
cles in the EEC Treaty." Thus, the public policy exceptions to the
EEC Treaty which likely forbid Community-wide harmonization of
abortion-funding law run counter to the economic purpose 'of the
Treaty's anti-discrimination provisions.
II. THE PRIVACY DOCTRINE AND U.S. APPROACHES TO FUNDING
FOR MEDICALLY-NECESSARY ABORTIONS
A. Harris v McRae
While the EC Member States fund medical expenses for the
vast majority of their citizens, the U.S., through Medicaid, subsi-
dizes only its neediest citizens' necessary health care costs, includ-
See Dominick, 14 Fordham Intl L J at 639 (cited in note 5).
See Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously at 90-94 (cited in note 31).
52 Abortion, largely because it is so controversial, carries a symbolic weight which could
very well make the absence of funding for medically-necessary abortions a more powerful
influence on the composition of the work force than would denial of funding for other medi-
cal treatments.
" See Curral, 20 Ga J Intl & Comp L at 20-21 (cited in note 28).
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ing those expenses associated with childbirth. Since the adoption
of the Hyde Amendment " in 1979, however, the federal govern-
ment has not subsidized the cost of medically-necessary abortions.
In Harris v McRae,55 the Court left the funding question to the
states, much as the ECJ under Article 48 or 59 might choose to
defer to Member States' anti-abortion policies.
While acknowledging that freedom of choice can be restricted
by financial constraints, the Supreme Court asserted:
[A]lthough government may not place obstacles in the
path of a woman's exercise of her freedom of choice, it
need not remove those not of its own creation. Indigence
falls in the latter category. The financial constraints that
restrict an indigent woman's ability to enjoy the, full
range of constitutionally protected freedom of choice are
the product not of governmental restrictions on access to
abortions, but rather of her indigence. 6
The Court reasoned further that:
[T]he Hyde Amendment. . . places no governmental ob-
stacle in the path of a woman who chooses to terminate
her pregnancy, but rather, by means of unequal subsidi-
zation of abortion and other medical services [including
childbirth], encourages alternative activity deemed in the
public interest.
57
The federal government, argued the Harris majority, has no
obligation to subsidize a poor woman's medically-necessary abor-
tion, despite the fact that abortion may be the only means availa-
ble to protect her health and even though the government has cho-
sen, through Medicaid, to subsidize practically all other medically-
necessary procedures, including those associated with childbirth.
The majority stated:
[T]he Hyde Amendment leaves an indigent woman with
at least the same range of choice in deciding whether to
obtain a medically necessary abortion as she would have
had if Congress had chosen to subsidize no health care
costs at all.58
' Pub L No 96-123, § 109, 93 Stat 926 (1979).
' 448 US 297 (1980).
" Id at 316.
' Id at 315.
'8 Id at 317.
51 7]
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The Harris majority held that the government's sole obligation is
to refrain from penalizing a woman for exercising her free choice.,
It drew what it considered to be a bright line between government
action (penalty) and inaction (failure to subsidize), permitting the
latter as constitutional, while prohibiting the former.
B. Criticisms of the Harris Penalty/Subsidy Distinction
The Harris holding hinges on the majority's determination
that the Fourteenth Amendment right to privacy, which guaran-
tees a woman's right to an abortion, does not require the govern-
ment to subsidize indigent women's abortion costs. The Harris ma-
jority asserts that the Hyde Amendment is constitutional because
the State's refusal to subsidize does not create "a government ob-
stacle in the path of a woman who chooses to terminate her preg-
nancy." 0 This argument, however, ultimately fails because it
presumes as prelegal and natural an obstacle that the State itself
placed in the path of indigent women prior to the State's refusal to
subsidize abortion. The State, and not the force of nature, ulti-
mately determined that medical services would be a private com-
modity and not a publicly available good. Put simply, the reason
that abortion is inaccessible to those unable to pay is that the
State, through the common law of contract and property, chose to
place market value on medical services.
In Roe v Wade,"1 the Supreme Court determined that the
"right of privacy . .. founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's
concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action ...
is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not
to terminate her pregnancy." '62 Harris, decided in light of Roe, ana-
lyzed abortion as a privacy issue. The right to abortion, as framed
in privacy terms in Roe, "presumes that government noninterven-
tion into the private sphere promotes a woman's freedom of
choice."63 Roe held that the right to privacy, meaning the prohibi-
tion of government intervention into women's decisions concerning
pregnancy, guarantees the legality of abortion. One might argue
that since the privacy guarantee of government nonintervention
does not permit the government to act to limit a woman's abortion
Harris, 448 US at 317 n 19.
Id at 315 (emphasis added).
410 US 113 (1973).
Id at 153.
C' catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law 100
(Harvard U Press, 1987) (emphasis added).
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choice, it cannot mandate intervention ' by requiring government
funding for abortion.
Implicit in this argument and in the Harris penalty/subsidy
analysis are the traditional notions that the Constitution is a char-
ter of negative liberties 65 and that the Fourteenth Amendment and
the right to privacy derived from it confer "rights of protection
from rather than by the government." 66 Any interpretation pre-
mised on the idea that the Constitution serves to protect citizens
from governmental intrusion relies on the distinction between gov-
ernment action and passivity. In light of previous Supreme Court
treatment of the Constitution as primarily a doctrine of negative
liberties,6 7 the Court's decision to deny that the Constitution man-
dates funding for an indigent woman's medically-necessary abor-
tions should not be surprising.
The distinction between negative and positive rights, and thus
the Harris penalty/subsidy line, is not nearly so useful an analyti-
cal tool as the Harris majority assumes. In his dissent in Harris,
for instance, Justice Brennan avoided the problems inherent in an-
alyzing abortion funding in terms of positive duties and negative
rights.6 Justice Brennan focused on the effect of the governmental
decision to fund childbirth but not abortion, and ignored whether
that effect results from government's actions or inactions, or from
a penalty or subsidy.
64 Note, however, that the categories of intervention/nonintervention and government
action/inaction must be carefully scrutinized. What might at first blush appear to be nonin-
tervention can often, from a different perspective, be described as governmental interven-
tion. See notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
6 See David P. Currie, Positive and Negative Constitutional Rights, 53 U Chi L Rev
864, 866 n 12 (1986).
66 Id at 864, quoting'Judge Posner in Jackson v City of Joliet, 715 F2d 1200, 1203 (7th
Cir 1983), cert denied, 465 US 1049 (1983). Judge Posner argued that the Constitution
is a charter of negative rather than positive liberties. . . . The men who wrote the
Bill of Rights were not concerned that Government might do too little for the
people but that it might do too much to them. The Fourteenth Amendment,
adopted in 1868 at the height of laissez-faire thinking, sought to protect Ameri-
cans from oppression by state government, not to secure them basic governmental
services.
Jackson, 715 F2d at 1203.
07 See Currie, 53 U Chi L Rev at 866 (cited in note 65).
68 Justice Brennan insisted that:
Roe and its progeny established that the pregnant woman has a right to be free
from state interference with her choice to have an abortion . . . .The proposition
for which these cases stand thus is not that the State is under an affirmative obli-
gation . . .; it is that the State must refrain from wielding its enormous power and
influence in a manner that might burden the pregnant woman's freedom to choose
whether to have an abortion.
Harris, 448 US 297 at 330 (Brennan dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
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Justice Brennan's approach mirrors the ECJ's methodology in
Pierik I. The ECJ interpreted Article 48 of the EEC Treaty to
require the Member States to guarantee that funding discrepancies
among their health insurance programs would not inhibit workers
from moving freely within the EC in pursuit of employment." The
ECJ did not inquire whether Article 48 imposed on the Dutch gov-
ernment an affirmative duty to fund and did not ask whether
Dutch failure to fund would constitute a governmentally imposed
"obstacle" to free movement. Rather, the court looked solely to the
discriminatory effect of the government's failure to fund. The ECJ,
unlike the Harris majority, recognized and sought to protect work-
ers against what one commentator has called "the chilling effect of
the denial of benefits as well as the discriminatory effect of differ-
ential funding. 70
Justice Brennan's dissent to Harris rejected the majority's
contention that the constitutionality of the Hyde Amendment
swings on the issue of whether or not the State acted in refusing to
fund abortion. The dissent did not, however, explicitly attack the
suspect premise on which the majority's penalty/subsidy distinc-
tion depends; rather, the Brennan dissent only implicitly acknowl-
edged that the line that the majority placed between governmental
intrusion and nonintrusion into the constitutionally protected pri-
vate realm was determined by government action and was not, as
the majority apparently assumes, fixed by nature.
Prior to the government's decision to withdraw abortion fund-
ing and prior even to the decision to fund other health care needs,
including childbirth, the government acted when it made the
"quite conscious decision to treat the needed medical procedure as
a purely private commodity available only to those who can pay
the market price. '71 The Harris majority neglected to acknowledge
that markets themselves, since they are contingent on the govern-
mentally imposed common law constructs of contract and property
law, result from government action. 72 Thus, the government's fail-
ure to "subsidize," when judged in light of the government's af-
09 Case 182/78, Bestuur van het Algemeen Ziekenfonds Drenthe-Platteland v G. Pierik
("Pierik 11"), 1979 ECR 1977, 1998-99, 1980:2 CMLR 88.
70 Rhonda Copelon, Losing the Negative Right of Privacy: Building Sexual and Repro-
ductive Freedom, 18 NYU Rev L & Soc Change 15, 21 (1990-91).
7' Laurence H. Tribe, The Abortion Funding Conundrum: Inalienable Rights, Affirma-
tive Duties, and the Dilemma of Dependence, 99 Harv L Rev 330, 336 (Nov 1985).
72 See Cass R. Sunstein, After the Rights Revolution 19-20 (Harvard U Press, 1990).
See also, Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 Colum L Rev 1697, 1718
(1984).
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firmative act of designating medical services as a private marketa-
ble commodity, more properly represents a government penalty
denying to those unable to pay the constitutional right to choose
medically-necessary abortions over childbirth. Viewed in this man-
ner, the government's refusal to subsidize indigent women's abor-
tions constitutes the failure to remove a constitutionally impermis-
sible obstacle of the government's own making.73 For that reason,
the federal government should require state funding for medically-
necessary abortions.
III. SEX EQUALITY AND ABORTION FUNDING UNDER THE U.S.
CONSTITUTION AND THE EEC TREATY
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 74
and general antidiscrimination and equality principles central to
the EEC Treaty75 should be interpreted to require the American
and EC Member States to fund medically-necessary abortions for
indigent women. Although neither the ECJ nor the Supreme Court
has adopted this view, a substantial body of scholarship 7 and
American state court jurisprudence77 lends support to the argu-
73 Public education, unlike medical care, is one example of a service that the govern-
ment has opted to make publicly available. In light of the state's choice to fund primary and
secondary education, if the state denied any of its citizens financing for public education,
that decision would look much more like a "government penalty," than the mere refusal to
subsidize. Interestingly, though the Supreme Court did not consider the issue as one of
penalty and subsidy, it suggested that absolute deprivation of public education to those
wholly unable to pay would be unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause. San
Antonio Independent School District v Rodriguez, 411 US 1, 20 (1973).
" "[N]o State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws." US Const, Amend XIV, § 1.
75 See, for example, EEC, Art 119 (guaranteeing equal pay for men and women) and
Council Dir 79/7, 1979 OJ L6:24 (cited in note 5) (a corollary to Article 119 that guarantees
equal treatment for men and women in matters of social security, including all statutory
health insurance plans).
" See, for example, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality
in Relation to Roe v Wade, 63 NC L Rev 375 (1985); Kenneth Karst, Foreword: Equal
Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 Harv L Rev 1, 53-59 (1977); Sylvia Law,
Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U Pa L Rev 955, 971-87 (1984); MacKinnon,
Feminism Unmodified at ch 8 (cited in note 63); Catherine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on
Sex Equality Under Law, 100 Yale L J 1281 (1991). See also, Webster v Reproductive
Health Services, 492 US 490, 537 (1989) (Blackmun dissenting). Justice Blackmun criticized
intrusions on the right to abortion because they threaten not only the right to privacy, but
women's sex equality with men: "I fear for the liberty and equality of the millions of women
who have lived and come of age in the 16 years since Roe was decided." Id at 538.
" See MacKinnon, 100 Yale L J at 1320 n 165 (cited in note 76), citing Doe v Maher,
40 Conn Supp 394, 515 A2d 134 (Conn Super Ct 1986) (restriction of abortion funding to
life-threatening situations violates, among other things, the Connecticut Equal Rights
Amendment), but also citing Fischer v Department of Public Welfare, 85 Pa Commw 215,
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ment that principles of sexual equality require State funding of
medically-necessary abortions.
A. Sex Equality and Abortion Funding in the U.S.
American courts traditionally apply a standard of "formal
equality" to sex discrimination cases: laws failing to treat similarly
situated men and women alike violate the Equal Protection
Clause. 8 However, to the extent that a law having greater impact
on women than men addresses "real differences" between the
sexes, it satisfies Equal Protection Requirements.7 e The Hyde
Amendment, for example, primarily affects women and not men. 0
Under a traditional equality analysis, one might argue that the un-
equal impact of a childbirth/abortion law is constitutionally ac-
ceptable because the differences between men and women that are
relevant to childbirth and abortion funding are purely biological as
only women can give birth to children or have abortions.
However, traditional equality analysis of abortion funding is
unsatisfactory as it assumes that anatomical differences alone
cause abortion restrictions to affect primarily women and not men.
As Professor Sylvia Law explains, "it is not entirely nature that
imposes upon women the devastating burdens of . . . pregnancy;
482 A2d 1137 (1984) (restriction of abortion funding to life-threatening situations does not
violate state equal rights amendment).
71 See Rostker v Goldberg, 453 US 57, 79 (1981) (the "Constitution requires that Con-
gress treat similarly situated persons similarly . ). See also, Mary E. Becker, Rights of
Unwed Parents: Feminist Approaches, 1989 Social Service Rev 496, 499, citing Orr v Orr,
440 US 268 (1979). In the 1970s, the Supreme Court struck down numerous statutes that
employed overt sex-based classifications. See, for example, Ginsburg, 63 NC L Rev at 377-78
(1985) (cited in note 77), citing Reed v Reed, 404 US 71 (1971); Frontiero v Richardson, 411
US 677 (1973), Weinberger v Wiesenfeld, 420 US 636 (1975); Califano v Goldfarb, 430 US
199 (1977); Califano v Westcott, 443 US 76 (1979); Wengler v Druggists Mutual Insurance
Co., 446 US 142 (1980); Stanton v Stanton, 421 US 7 (1975); Craig v Boren, 429 US 190
(1976).
71 See Michael M. v Sonoma County Superior Court, 450 US 464, 469 (1981) (Rehn-
quist plurality opinion) (the "Court has consistently upheld statutes where the gender clas-
sification is not invidious, but rather realistically reflects the fact that the sexes are not
similarly situated .... (citing Parham v Hughes, 441 US 347 (1979); Califano v Webster,
430 US 313 (1977); Schlesinger v Ballard, 419 US 498 (1975)). See also, Becker, 1989 Social
Service Rev at 501-02 (cited in note 78).
" See Webster v Reproductive Health Services, No 88-605, Supreme Court of the
United States, October 1988 Term, Brief for the National Coalition Against Domestic Vio-
lence 7 ("[T]he direct impact of a measure restricting abortion falls on a class of people that
consists exclusively of women.").
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the social and legal ethos that makes women solely responsible for
nurturing the children they bear also plays a part."81 Furthermore,
The traditional patriarchal stereotype of "woman's role"
undermines all the equal citizenship values: respect, par-
ticipation, and responsibility. To the extent that the ster-
eotype is embodied in law or otherwise brought to bear in
public life of the society-in other words, to the extent
that the phenomenon of women's dependency on men is
socially imposed-the principle of equal citizenship pre-
sumptively requires intervention by the courts.8 "
Traditional approaches to equality also ignore the ways in
which the "differences between women and men (real or imagined)
have been turned systematically into advantages for men and dis-
advantages for women." ' Legally enforced social norms simultane-
ously devalue childcare and create the stereotype that women bear
a natural predisposition to and responsibility for childcare. Such
legal and social influences discourage women from entering more
remunerative occupations. Social pressures have transformed
women's biological capacity to bear children and to nurse into an
economic disadvantage perpetuating women's social inferiority to
men.
" Law, 132 U Pa L Rev at 999-1000 (cited in note 76). See also Ginsburg, 63 NC L Rev
at 382 (cited in note 76) (quoting Karst, 91 Harv L Rev at 57 (cited in note 76)):
It is not a sufficient answer to charge it all to women's anatomy-a natural, not
man-made phenomenon. Society, not anatomy, "places a greater stigma on un-
married women who become pregnant than on the men who father their children."
Society expects, but nature does not command, that "women take the major re-
sponsibility ...for child care."
Furthermore, "[slocial custom, pressure, exclusion from well paying jobs, the structure
of the marketplace, and lack of adequate daycare have exploited women's commitment to
and caring for children and relegated women to childrearing and traditional mothering
roles." MacKinnon, 100 Yale L J at 1312 (cited in note 76).
82 Karst, 91 Harv L Rev at 55 (cited in note 76).
Becker, 1989 Social Service Rev at 499 (cited in note 78), citing MacKinnon, Femi-
nism Unmodified at 32-45 (cited in note 63); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Sexual Harassment
of Working Women 101-41 (Yale U Press, 1979). In many cases where courts require gender
neutral laws because they deem sex differences irrelevant, gender "neutrality" nonetheless
handicaps women. Given that male standards define societal rules, women will not fare
equally as well as men if achievement is defined in terms more suited to male
characteristics:
Virtually every quality that distinguishes men from women is already affirmatively
compensated in this society. Men's physiology defines most sports, . . . their so-
cially designed biographies define workplace expectations and successful career
patterns, their perspectives and concerns define quality in scholarship, their ex-
periences and obsessions define merit, . . . their presence defines family . . ..
MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified at 36 (cited in note 63).
5171
534 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM
The law plays a large part in sustaining, and even in creat-
ing,8 ' sexual stereotypes that blind courts, as well as the general
public, to the ways in which women have become dependent on
men because of their capacity to bear children." In Muller v Ore-
gon,8" the Court upheld maximum hour laws for women though it
had invalidated a similar provision for men only three years ear-
lier. 7 The Court justified making this gender-based distinction be-
cause, "as healthy mothers are essential to vigorous offspring, the
physical well-being of woman becomes an object of public interest
and care in order to preserve the strength and vigor of the race," 88
and since a maximum hour law would allow a woman to
"proper[ly] discharge ...her maternal function."8 9
More recently, the Supreme Court has taken the position that
"gender-based differentiation created by [statute] is forbidden by
the Constitution, at least when supported by no more substantial
justification than 'archaic and overbroad' generalizations . "...90
Nevertheless, the Court continues to engage in this sort of stere-
otyping. In several Supreme Court cases involving the rights of un-
married fathers concerning their biological children,91 the Justices
expressed opinions based on sex stereotypes that portray women as
having a greater responsibility than men to care for children.92 The
' See text at note 95.
" This Comment examines only the legally and socially created inequalities of chil-
drearing. Other significant Equal Protection issues germane to the abortion question include
the unequal burdens of pregnancy, the coercive environment in which heterosexual inter-
course occurs, and the lack of availability of safe, effective, and socially acceptable forms of
contraception. See, for example, MacKinnon, 100 Yale L J at 1281 (cited in note 76).
8 208 US 412 (1908).
Lochner v New York, 198 US 45 (1905).
88 Muller v Oregon, 208 US at 421.
88 Id at 422. -
90 Califano v Goldfarb, 430 US 199, 206-07 (1977), citing Schlesinger v Ballard, 419 US
498, 508 (1975) and Stanton v Stanton, 421 US 7, 14 (1975).
9' Parham v Hughes, 441 US 347 (1979) (upholding state law barring unmarried fa-
thers, but not unwed mothers, from bringing a tort claim for the wrongful death of their
children); Caban v Mohammed, 441 US 380 (1979) (overturning state law denying an un-
married father the right to veto an adoption, while the mother retained that right); Lehr v
Robertson, 463 US 248 (1983) (upholding constitutionality of denying father the right to
protest the adoption of his child by the mother and her new husband).
"2 See also, Michael M. v Superior Court, 450 US 464 (1981), in which the Court up-
held a California statutory rape law which made a male, even a male under eighteen, guilty
of statutory rape if he had sex with a woman under eighteen. Justice Rehnquist, writing a
plurality opinion, reasoned that "[b]ecause virtually all of the significant harmful and ines-
capably identifiable consequences of teenage pregnancy fall on the young female, a legisla-
ture acts well within its authority when it elects to punish only the participant who, by
nature, suffers few of the consequences of his conduct." Id at 473 (emphasis added). Justice
Rehnquist and the Michael M. plurality failed to examine carefully the gender differences
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Court attributed that responsibility to biological, and not socially
imposed, considerations, thus removing those sex differences from
constitutional scrutiny. In one case, Justice Stevens referred to the
mother's "unshakable responsibility for the care of the child," '
while in another he asserted that the "significance of the biological
connection is that it offers the natural father an opportunity...
to develop a relationship with his offspring."94
The difficulty that the Court and the public at large have in
recognizing the law's discriminatory effect on women as child bear-
ers and nurturers illustrates the "educative force of law, its use in
training women [not to mention men] to accept patriarchy as a gift
of nature."95 Due to women's legally and socially created childrear-
ing role, both married and unmarried women's subordination to
men only increases when they have children, particularly when
they do not bear those children by choice. As the Supreme Court
acknowledged in several unmarried father cases, the same is not
true for men when they father children. Thus, a law that funds
childbirth while denying abortion monies tends to deny to women
choices which remain open to men, and serves to preserve a system
that makes women dependent on men. Such a discriminatory im-
pact is constitutionally impermissible because law and society, and
not mere biology, have ensured that men and women are not simi-
larly situated with respect to childbirth and abortion.
An analysis of abortion funding that employs a standard for
equality which does not acknowledge the systematically disadvan-
taged position in which law and society place women as child-
rearers fails because of its narrowness. Only a broader conception
of equality recognizing women's socially created handicaps and,
therefore, requiring state funding for medically necessary abor-
that they used to justify the disparate impact that statutory rape law has on men and
women. "This failure of analysis means that the plurality ... mistakes stereotype for biol-
ogy." Law, 132 U Pa L Rev at 999 (cited in note 76).
" Law, 132 U Pa L Rev at 991 (cited in note 76) (quoting Caban, 441 US at 408 (em-
phasis added)).
" Id, quoting Lehr, 463 US at 262 (emphasis added).
" Karst, 91 Harv L Rev at 55 (cited in note 76). "No human system of dominance and
dependency is older than the system of male-female relations. The system's 'deep struc-
tures' are so deep that we have only begun to imagine the features of a society free from
inequalities based on sex." Id at 53 (citations omitted).
See also Law, 132 U Pa L Rev at 995 (cited in note 76) ("[Allthough sex-based classifi-
cations are unjust in relation to individuals . . . who do not fit the stereotypes imposed on
them, the primary constitutional infirmity in such classifications is not that they are inaccu-
rate, but rather that they are self-fulfilling.").
" See note 91.
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tions, adequately upholds the principles of equality expressed in
the Fourteenth Amendment.
B. Sex Equality and Abortion Funding in the EC
Council Directive 79/7,97 which mandates the progressive im-
plementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and
women in matters of social security, could provide the ECJ with a
basis for requiring Member States to fund workers'98 medically-
necessary abortions. This argument, however, has not yet been
made before the ECJ. The advantage to an ECJ analysis of the
abortion-funding issue based on Directive 79/7 is that the direc-
tive, unlike Articles 48 and 59, contains no public policy exception.
Article 4 of Council Directive 79/7 proclaims that "[tlhe prin-
ciple of equal treatment means that there shall be no discrimina-
tion whatsoever on ground of sex either directly, or indirectly ...,
in particular as concerns . . the scope of [health care] schemes
and the conditions of access thereto ...."99
As this Comment has argued, a sexual equality standard which
is faithful to the goal of true equality must not ignore the social
preconditions of inequality which make traditional equality analy-
sis insufficient. If the ECJ adopted such a standard, it would con-
clude, as this Comment argues, that health insurance schemes
which fund childbirth but not abortion discriminate on the basis of
sex.'00 Thus, the ECJ should hold that Directive 79 requires those
Member States whose statutory health plans fund childbirth to
pay for legally performed medically-necessary abortions.
" Council Dir 79/7, 1979 OJ L6:24 (cited in note 5), was derived from EEC, Art 119,
which guarantees equal pay to men and women.
" The scope of Council Dir 79/7 is perhaps somewhat more narrow than either Article
48, where the ECJ has construed the term "worker" broadly, or Article 59, which would
protect any woman receiving the "service" of abortion. Council Dir 79/7 applies:
to the working population-including self-employed persons, workers and self-em-
ployed persons whose activity is interrupted by illness, accident or involuntary
unemployment and persons seeking employment-and to retired or invalid work-
ers and self-employed persons.
Council Dir 79/7, art 2, 1979 OJ at L6:24 (cited in note 5).
11 Id, art 4, 1979 OJ at L6:25. See also, id. art 3, 1979 OJ at L6:24 (defining the scope
of Council Dir 79/7 to include "statutory schemes which provide protection against
sickness").
"' See also Joyce Outshoorn, Abortion Law Reform: A Woman's Right to Choose?, in
Mary Buckley and Malcolm Anderson, eds, Women, Equality and Europe 204 (MacMillan
Press, 1988).
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CONCLUSION
Traditional equality analysis and the Harris majority ap-
proach to funding fail as useful analytical tools because they as-
sume as natural and prelegal a status quo that works to the disad-
vantage of women and the poor. Traditional equality analysis of
abortion produces unequal outcomes for men and women because
law and society have created a system that places a heavier burden
on women than men for childrearing. 0 1 Likewise, an approach to
abortion funding that ignores the State's role in making medical
treatment unavailable to those who cannot pay unwittingly dis-
guises a legally created market system as a natural phenomenon
for which the State bears no responsibility.0 2
The United States would profit by applying the ECJ's reason-
ing in Pierik II to the abortion funding question. The ECJ in
Pierik II, like Justice Brennan in his dissent to Harris, looked only
at the effects of government policies, concluding that the denial of
funding would impermissibly curtail guaranteed freedoms. 10 3
Whether relying on the privacy doctrine or the Equal Protection
Clause, the Supreme Court, had it focussed on the law's effects,
would have found the Hyde Amendment constitutionally
unacceptable.
Instead the Court framed the abortion funding issue as a ques-
tion of whether the government acted in choosing not to fund
medically-necessary abortions and put itself in the position of de-
ciding the case on the basis of an unacknowledged policy choice.
That policy decision consisted of differentiating between govern-
ment action and inaction. The Supreme Court unknowingly did
what the EEC Treaty public policy exceptions explicitly require:
the Court made a woman's constitutionally guaranteed right to pri-
vacy "subject to limitations justified on grounds of public policy
99104
The abortion-funding question challenges the EC and its
Member States to scrutinize the conflict between, on the one hand,
the retention of national autonomy over controversial policies and,
Note that childrearing burdens are but one of the abortion-related inequalities be-
tween men and women. See note 85.
'02 See Sunstein, After the Rights Revolution at 19 (cited in note 72) ("Seeing the com-
mon law status quo as prelegal and neutral, judges [and many others] ...regarded them
...as the state of nature."). While Professor Sunstein referred specifically to the Lochner
era judges, his remarks could just as appropriately be addressed to the Harris majority.
"I Case 182/78, Bestuur van het Algemeen Ziekenfonds Drenthe-Platteland v G.
Pierik ("Pierik .1I"), 1979 ECR 1977, 1980:2 CMLR 88.
0'4 EEC, Art 48(3).
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on the other, the economic goals embodied in the SEA and the
higher aspirations represented by a Community Bill of Rights. As
the EC addresses the abortion funding issue, the Member States
will be forced to ponder not only the very nature of their current
alliance, but also their aspirations for the future of the Commu-
nity. The Member States' desire to retain control over controver-
sial policies, as expressed by Judge Walsh of the Irish Supreme
Court in Society for the Protection of Unborn Children (Ireland)
v Stephen Grogan and Others,'10 5 shows how important resolution
of the autonomy and federalism debate will be to the EC's future.
The tension between the public policy exceptions and the aims
of the SEA and the Community Bill of Rights, challenges the
Member States to decide whether they will share the benefits of a
fully unified Europe, or retain autonomy over internal policies.
The EC Member States confront the same sort of dilemma created
by the weaknesses of the Articles of Confederation. The American
States chose to sacrifice a measure of autonomy in order to gain
the strength provided by a unified whole. The EC Member States
will soon have to decide which course they will follow.
,os See note 3. Society for the Protection of Unborn Children (Ireland) v Stephen
Grogan and Others, 1990:1 CMLR 689, 704 (Irish Supreme Court, Dec 19, 1989).
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